Unlike other primates, human foragers have an egalitarian society. Therefore, the evo-1 lution of egalitarian behaviour has been the subject of long-standing debate in a wide 2 variety of disciplines. A recent hypothesis states that a social control against potentially 3 dominant individuals played an important role in the emergence of an egalitarian society, 4 although this has not been modelled directly. In the present study, we modelled this hy-5 pothesis based on the n-player game framework, in which the owner, who may attempt 6 to monopolise resources, could be punished by a coalition of other group members. Our 7 results suggest that a potentially despotic payoff structure can promote the evolution of 8 egalitarian behaviour. Besides, large group size, small cost of competition, and variation 9 * tmr.kohei@gmail.com 1 in the strengths of individuals can promote the evolution of egalitarian behaviour. Our 10 results suggest the importance of both social control against dominant individuals and 11 benefits of a coalition for the evolution of egalitarian behaviour. 12 Keywords 13 coalition formation; resource sharing; equality 14 2 1 Introduction 15
where p = x 01 + x 11 , p s = ϕp, and p w = (1 − ϕ)p. 104 The payoffs of the four strategies as an owner are 105 π 00,s = n−1
π 01,s = π 00,s ,
π 01,w = π 00,w ,
π 10,s = π 10,w = π 11,s = π 11,w = R/n,
where 106f (s i , s j ) = Because their behaviour as owners is identical, the payoffs of monopoliser and greedy 107 individuals are the same depending on the strength of individuals. Further, the payoffs 108 of pacifist and egalitarian individuals are identical irrespective of their strengths, because 109 they share the resource.
110
Likewise, the payoffs of the four strategies as a peer are 111 ρ 00,s = ρ 00,w = yR/n,
ρ 01,w = yR/n
ρ 10,s = ρ 10,w = ρ 00,s ,
where y = x 10 + x 11 . The payoffs of monopoliser and pacifist individuals are identical
x
x ′ 10 = [ϕe β(σπ 10,s +(1−σ)ρ 10,s ) x 10 + (1 − ϕ)e β(σπ 10,w +(1−σ)ρ 10,w ) x 10 ]/W,
where σ represents the intensity of selection. For simplicity, we assume σ = 1/2. W is 123 Figure 1 shows the payoffs of the owner and peers in different situations.
124
Numerical Analysis 125 We set x 00 = 0.97, x 01 = 0.01, x 10 = 0.01, and x 11 = 0.01 as the initial conditions. We 126 regard the frequencies after 30,000 generations as equilibrium frequencies. occur, indicating that egalitarian individuals can only receive equally distributed payoffs.
162
The fitness values of strong and weak pacifist individuals were almost stable, although 163 they became the same after the extinction of monopoliser and greedy individuals. 164 We also investigated which factors can affect the evolution of egalitarian behaviour. Figure 4 also shows that large group size, n, can promote the 168 evolution of egalitarian behaviour.
169
We further investigate the effects of group size, n, and ϕ on the probability of winning 170 of the coalition and fitness of greedy individuals at the initial condition. Figure 5 shows 171 effects of n on the probability of winning the coalition and the fitness value of greedy 172 individuals.
173
As n increases, the probability of winning the coalition and the fitness value of greedy 174 individuals increases. This can be because larger groups can include a larger number of 175 C 1 individuals, resulting in higher probability of winning the coalition.
176 Figure 6 shows the effects of ϕ on the probability of winning the coalition and the 177 fitness value of greedy individuals.
178
As ϕ increases, the probability of winning the coalition decreases. The optimal value 179 of ϕ exists to maximise the fitness value of greedy individuals.
180

Discussion
181
In the present study, we investigated the evolution of egalitarian behaviour based on an shown in Figure 2 , the fitness value of strong greedy individuals is larger than that of 223 strong monopoliser individuals, while that of weak greedy individuals is less than that of 224 weak monopoliser individuals. Therefore, increase in ϕ also increases strong individuals, 225 which could provide an adaptive advantage to greedy individuals. A disadvantage is the 226 decrease in the probability of winning the coalition. At the initial condition, since the 227 frequency of C 1 individuals is very low, the number of individuals joining the coalition is 228 very small. As ϕ increases, the owner is more likely to be strong and thus less likely to 229 be defeated; that is, the probability that the coalition wins decreases (Figure 6(a) ). As a 230 result, the optimal value of ϕ is determined based on the balance of the above-mentioned 231 advantages and disadvantage.
232
In this study, we assumed the repeated interaction. In the supplementary information, 233 we also examined the one-shot interaction. Egalitarian behaviour is more likely to evolve 234 in the case of one-shot interaction than that of repeated interaction, while the qualitative within the coalition. In this situation, the evolution of egalitarian behaviour is likely to
